Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Round Square, philosophy: an example of something non-existent, originally by A. Meinong (A. Meinong, “Über Gegenstandstheorie”, 1904). Meinong assumes that there must be this object, so that we can talk about it to determine its non-existence. See also non-existence, existence, truth, necessity, features, properties._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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W.V.O. Quine on Round Square - Dictionary of Arguments
VII (a) 5 Round Square/Quine: There can be no unrealized possibility - it is not meaningless! - If all contradictions were meaningless, we would have no test of what has meaning and what does not - descriptions eliminate the problem of how to deny existence. Negation: E.g. "The author of Waverley does not exist" would then be: the alternation: "Either each thing has not written Waverley or more than two things wrote Waverley". "Round square" cannot be analyzed in the same way. Neither can be Pegasus be analyzed as a single word. >Pegasus example. Solution: basic: "the thing that pegasizes": then there is no more tacit presupposition that was demanded by the tradition. VII (a) 7 Existence/Descriptions/Quine: descriptions eliminate the problem of how to deny existence. Negation: Example "the author of Waverley is not": would then be: the alternation: "Either every thing did not write Waverley or more than two things wrote Waverley." "Round Square": cannot be analyzed in the same way. - - - III 258 Unicorn/round square/name/meaning/singular term/Quine: Conclusion: that something has the task of denoting something (i.e. is significant) does not depend at all on it fulfilling this task. Significant/Quine: at first only: to have the task of designating something. Unsuccessful designation! In any case, the designated object is not the meaning of the word. (Confusion of meaning and designated object). >Meaning, >Reference._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Round Square
